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3 January 1979

TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE
(FOUO 1/79)

WEST

EUROPE

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

SOVIET COMMENT ON DANISH AND NORWEGIAN AIR FORCES

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 10, Oct 78 signed to press 5 Oct 78 pp 49-52

[Article by Lt Col V. Sokolin: "The AF of Norway and Denmark"]

[Excerpt] Norway and Denmark are constantly drawing the attention of the aggressive circles of the NATO bloc of which they are members. Attaching much strategic attention to this region, the leadership of the United States and NATO is constantly exerting pressure on the Norwegian and Danish governments, demanding from them a further increase of expenditures on equipping the armed forces with the latest models of weapons and combat materiel and preparation of their territories for the launching of additional contingents of the bloc's troops in the event of war. In particular, there are plans for building in Norway new depots for heavy arms and also for the adaptation of airbases for the location on them of the latest aircraft of the United States and other of the bloc countries. Holding the center of attention of NATO's militarists is modernization of the air forces of these countries, which are shortly to be provided with the newest American aircraft.

All these militarist preparations are accompanied by antisoviet slander and lies. There is no doubt that they will go against the vital interests of the Danish and Norwegian people and are intended to poison the good neighborly atmosphere and fruitful cooperation in Europe.

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT PROPOSES EC CIVIL RIGHTS CHARTER

Bonn EUROPA ARCHIV in German 10 Oct 78 pp 641-648

[Article by Prof Dr Karl Matthias Meessen, Chair for Public Law, particularly international and European law, Augsburg: "Basic Rights for Europe"]

[Text] An EC Charter of Civil Rights

"So long as the integration process of the Community has not progressed to the point that Community law also contains a generally accepted catalog of basic rights passed by a parliament and equal to the basic rights catalog of the constitution," Community law is, in the opinion of the Federal Constitutional Court, to be judged using German basic rights as a scale.¹ The suggestion of issuing a catalog of basic rights for the European Communities contained in the "so long as"-decision of 1974 has been extensively discussed but not followed up.² On 5 April 1977 the Parliament, Council and Commission of the European Communities solemnly approved the hitherto valid procedure, that is, the development of basic rights by decisions of the Court of Justice, these being, among other things, oriented on the constitutions of the member states and the Human Rights Convention of the Council of Europe.³ This served to bring the discussion to an end as the Commission then, on the basis of an opinion by Rudolf Bernhardt, viewed the existing basic rights protection as adequate "for the present and near future."⁴ It has been demonstrated in the meantime, however, that the European Parliament is not in the mood to further delay the question of a catalog of basic rights. In a 16 November 1977 decision the Parliament tasked the Commission with drawing up suggestions for the "special rights" of Community citizens.⁵ Following a debate in which both the incumbent president of the Council of Foreign Ministers and the president of the Commission intervened, on 13 April 1978 the Parliament decided to call a round table conference, to be held in Florence in October 1978, to draw up an "EC Charter of Civil Rights."⁶ The chairmanship was given to Mario Scelba.

The round table conference could contribute to changing a discussion hitherto conducted at an all too legalistic level to political action. Whereas human rights policy has become one of the great topics of public discussion, the same cannot be said now of European basic rights policy. It is not so much,

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as in the case of human rights policy, a matter of fighting clear grievances but rather one of promoting European integration. But this task — basic rights belong to the core of every modern constitution — also deserves broad public attention. It thus seems appropriate on the eve of the round table conference to consider if and to what degree "basic rights for Europe" can promote the European unity effort.

Protection Against Sovereign Arbitrariness

Execution and torture, imprisonment and forced labor are the instruments of sovereign arbitrariness most strongly affecting individuals. The task of personal rights of freedom is to exclude their use or, in the case of imprisonment, to at least bind them to the accomplishment of constitutional state prerequisites. Defence against sovereign force places such illegal acts in the foreground. Thus the basic right of freedom of religion protects a private area of freedom against sovereign attacks of all kinds and not just against imprisonment and exile. The right to a fair trial can, as the Federal Republic of Germany was recently lectured by the European High Court for Human Rights⁷, be impaired simply by excessive trial length.

Since the end of World War II protection against sovereign arbitrariness has been at the center of efforts toward international protection of human rights. These efforts have by no means been in vain. One need mention here only the human rights declaration of 1948, the declaration of principles in the famous Basket 3 of the Final Act of Helsinki of 1975 and the international agreement on civil and human rights of 1966 which became effective in 1976. Because of the extent of guarantees and the effectiveness of the legal protection system, the European Human Rights Convention of 1950 continues to be a model. Since 1974 the main convention and most of the supplementary protocols have become effective in all member states of the European Communities.

In European Community law the basic rights of freedom are protected not by explicit rules but rather by unwritten general legal principles. Their guarantee would thus be placed in the center of a common legal catalog of basic rights.

The fact that the member states can reach agreement on the content of basic rights of freedom relatively easily speaks for the adoption in written community law. It appears doubtful, however, that the material position of Community citizens would be improved by a written formulation of the catalog of basic rights. The High Court of the European Communities develops basic rights as general legal principles from common constitutional transfer of the member states and from international law obligations assumed by the member states. It has never required them to respect the maximum standard of basic rights protection among the member states. But, on the other hand, there is no case known in which Community legal protection has lagged behind that of any member state. This applies even to the "so long as"-case in which the Federal Constitutional Court came to the same verdict

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as did the High Court of the European Communities four years earlier in the same case.⁹ A basic rights catalog would hardly offer more since written basic rights first gain form only by their development in decisions.

In its already mentioned decision of 16 November 1977 the European Parliament required that the protection given by Community guarantees "had to apply not only against acts by Community organs but also against acts by governments of the individual states." Against acts of Bavarian state force one can appeal not only to the basic rights of the Bavarian constitution but also to the basic rights of the [federal] constitution. This degree of uniformity of basic rights protection is typical for federated states. But European integration has, as is known, not yet achieved a federated state quality. It is difficult to judge if it will come close to this if a citizen of the Federal Republic can appeal against the exercise of German sovereign power by reference not only to the basic rights of the constitution and the rights of the Human Rights Convention but also to Community basic rights. The accumulation of guarantees does not improve their quality. Through normally unsuccessful Community law basic rights complaints the citizen is more likely to become irritated than strengthened in his Community sense.

The European Communities could, of course, find a portion of their identity in a common acknowledgement of elementary human rights. The commonality of human rights, however, reaches beyond the borders of the Common Market and, in Europe, encompasses all 20 member states of the Council of Europe. The European Communities should emphasize this joint aspect with the other states of free Europe and drop everything that could possibly be misunderstood as competition with the institutions of the Council of Europe. A competitive situation becomes necessary only as the protection of human rights grows to be a "state" task for the EC in the work of political integration.

Overall, a basic rights catalog confirming basic human rights is not suitable as an instrument of European integration. Despite the friendly suggestion from Karlsruhe, this area of European basic rights policy can be relegated until the European Union comes in view.

Economic and Social Order

The selection of economic policy concepts from the scale ranging from a free market to a centrally managed economy can be limited by basic rights. Basic rights and other constitutional law principles can accordingly limit political freedom to organize in the area of social policy. European Community law also contains such determinations but these exhibit the structure of subjective rights only to a slight degree. The relatively strict cartel policy of the EEC Treaty represents a political decision — supplementable through other elements of organizational policy — for the free market economy. Freedom of competition serves not only the integration of national markets but also promotes the freedom of economic participation of the individual market participants. Article 119 of the EEC Treaty anchors the principle of equal pay for men and women for the entire area of the Common

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Market. Since the Degrenne/SABENA decision it applies directly to private labor contracts.¹⁰ Other economic and social rights guarantees have been developed as general legal principles from the constitutions of member states by the European High Court.

On a worldwide basis economic and social policy ideas differ widely. The density and effectiveness of international guarantees in this area cannot, in the narrow sense, be compared with the international protection of human rights despite ILO Convention, the European Social Charter of 1961 and the international social pact of 1966. More attention is, however, now paid to the connection between rights of freedom and economic and social order by the United Nations, this being obvious from the General Assembly resolution of 16 December 1977.¹¹ The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe has also resolved "to devote more attention to" the development of rights "in the social, economic and cultural area" in the future.¹²

It is apparent that this area of European basic rights policy has as yet failed to obtain any significance in the present discussion in the European Communities. But the formation tasks of the Communities lie directly in the field of economic and social policy. Further development to an economic and monetary union presupposes standardization of the economic and social order to a far greater degree than has hitherto taken place. So long as the negotiating framework for Community organs is not limited, one cannot blame the member states for exercising restraint in regard to a return to the majority principle in the Council and a transfer of further competences such as to a European Currency Bank.

There is no lack of questions requiring regulation. The debate about the correct path between a market economy and a directed economy could be taken up again. Community law regulation could regulate ownership in enterprises, be it a question of worker participation, investment control or nationalization. Agreements in principle about environmental protection could also be made at the Community level.

All the problems named are extremely controversial. This is particularly true when regulation, such as in the nationalization question, is directed primarily at member states. It would be unrealistic to hope for unanimous decisions in the Council on these questions. But the controversial nature of the questions need not be a disadvantage if, in place of the hitherto interstate opinion formation process, the path, eased by direct elections, of a community opinion formation by the people via the European Parliament is taken. The Parliament could, just by dealing with controversial problems, direct public interest to itself and promote the formation of opinion within political groups beyond state frontiers. The prerequisite would, of course, be that the Parliament retreat from its previous preference for compromises and dare to take up precise positions even if these were sometime supported only by slim majorities. The fact that such decisions are legally not binding is not necessarily harmful. They would in themselves not represent constitutional acts but rather only preparation for such. It will also be

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thus with the European constitution. The task of the Parliament is thus to act on the consciousness of the citizens and to lead them step by step to acceptance of the decisions about European economic and social order. The integration policy gain lies not in unity about current questions of principle, this not to be expected today or tomorrow in any case, but rather in the politicization of the European parliamentary system which could start immediately.

Political Participation

A number of prohibitions against discrimination obligate the member states of the European Communities to grant the nationals of other member states the same rights guaranteed their own nationals in questions of freedom of employment, freedom of settlement and the like. Being treated as natives serves integration of markets and involves not just regulated economic-related factual areas in European Community law. The question arises as to whether it should be expanded to political participation rights. Thus the member states could be obligated to grant citizens of other member states active and passive voting rights at the municipal level. The Commission and Parliament seem to take a positive stance toward these ideas.¹³ On the one hand, the legal relevance of state borders would again decline and, on the other, the joining of foreigners in interest groups could strongly influence the political force relationships at the municipal level and thus perhaps reawaken latent national opposition. A careful approach would, in any case, do no harm.

It seems doubtful that general concepts which regulate political opinion formation in the member states like Article 28 of the constitution should become part of Community law. A certain degree of uniformity of political regulation is a business principle of European integration. Thus the entry of Greece, Spain and Portugal could be considered only after the democratic opinion formation process had again been introduced in these countries. But a European law connection would not, even if agreement could be reached, encompass revolutionary developments and — one thinks of the formation of national front governments in Italy or France — would make flexible reaction difficult. Homogeneity of state forms can be achieved only through political influence such as in the model of European policy toward the Papadopoulos government but not by European legal norms.

The legitimate task of European basic rights policy is the regulation of political participation in the European Communities themselves. Particularly if the Communities wish to become more than an interstate association, the citizen must be given the impression of participating in the Community opinion formation process. The introduction of direct elections is a step in the right direction. Until now all important questions of election procedure have been regulated according to different national rules. According to Article 7 of the 20 September 1976 decision on direct elections, the Parliament is authorized to draft a uniform election procedure.¹⁴ But such important questions as financing of parties and equal access to advertising on

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nationally controlled media and also still not regulated by written Community law. Such questions are, in part, not regulated at all or not uniformly regulated in the constitutions of member states and they also have, in part, structural peculiarities in the Communities which make adoption of member state principles difficult. The development of political participation rights should — at any rate, outside the area of political freedom rights such as freedom of the press and the like — not be left to court decisions alone. They must be actively formed by the political Community organs and, if at all possible, again in the way that the European Parliament next directs the public discussion.

Protection by Law

For individuals the basic rights are no more valuable than the judicial proceedings to make them valid. It is here that the international law instruments for protecting human rights differ. The legal protection system of the UN treaty of 1966 is so weak that neither the Soviet Union or Chile need fear its ratification. In contrast, the guarantees of the European Human Rights Convention permit an individual to appeal directly to the judicially independent Human Rights Commission in Strassburg. To the degree that the affected state does not redress a justifiable grievance, the Human Rights Commission is authorized to transfer the case to the European High Court of Human Rights which also sits in Strassburg.

The European Communities generally satisfy the standards of the Human Rights Convention. It is true that Community law does not provide for a special legal procedure against violations of basic rights comparable to constitutional complaints but the general legal protection system has a broad reach and, in particular, is accessible to the individual. Thus, Article 173 of the EEC Treaty gives anyone the right to submit a plea of nullity to the High Court of the European Communities in Luxembourg against decisions directed at him and against Community organ legal ordinances affecting him directly and immediately. In such proceedings the validity of Community organ legal acts can be measured against the scale of treaties and other Community laws including basic rights.

Every expansion of Community law basic rights will have to be reviewed to see if the legal protection system is adequately adopted. Even within the framework of present material law, the legal protection system of the Communities is open to improvement. There is, for example, a theoretical gap in legal protection when national courts violate European basic rights when applying Community law and do not make any use of the European High Court review provided in Article 177 of the EEC Treaty. This gap would also be closed by Tindeman's proposed direct complaint to the High Court of the European Communities.¹⁵ It is doubtful that this complaint — or, in the formulation of the Parliament, the individual complaint — should be limited to complaints against violations of basic rights. The separation of basic rights aspects from the other content of Community law norms is possible only with great difficulty and contradicts the present legal protection system.

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Moreover, the question also arises here as to whether the European Communities should begin competing with the legal protection institutions of the Human Rights Convention by introducing a basic rights complaint. It should rather be considered if the Communities should not as such adhere to the Human Rights Convention and thus make appeal of human rights complaints against legal acts of the Community organs possible. The arguments raised against this suggestion, which Hallstein, among others, has raised, are not convincing.¹⁶ The accomplishment of Community law will not be hindered because the complaints do not exert a lagging effect and because the Community organs are to ensure that a complaint is unsuccessful in all cases. The prestige of the European High Court would suffer as little as that of the Federal High Court from the possibility of making constitutional complaints or that of the Federal Constitutional Court through the authority to submit the case to the Strassburg courts. The Human Rights Convention, which hitherto has provided only for the membership of states, must certainly be changed. The signatory states who are not members of the European Communities should be prepared to accept this since the invulnerability of legal acts of the Communities has at least theoretically undermined the legal protection system of the Convention. From the viewpoint of integration policy, the Communities would also stand to gain. Within the framework of the Human Rights Convention they would be placed on the same level as states and, finally, those who still believe that an anti-human rights development of jurisprudence by the Luxemburg High Court cannot be excluded would be appeased.

Summary

It is not difficult to gain allegiance to common ideas among the member states of the European Communities by appealing to elementary human rights. But these common ideas reach far beyond the frontiers of the Communities and are, in Europe, to be respected primarily as the domain of the Council of Europe. The European Communities should orient themselves within this human rights policy framework and, after the international law prerequisites for this have been created, adhere to the European Human Rights Convention. If, in particular, respect for the laws of the Human Rights Convention is guaranteed in this way, it would be advisable to defer the plan for a comprehensive basic rights catalog for the European Communities until political union comes closer.

The European Parliament should, as soon as possible, adopt the economic and social basic rights as well as the political participation laws. Progress in the European integration process is achievable only if the framework for a European economic and social order is marked off step by step and the participation of Community citizens in the political opinion formation process in the Communities is regulated. The European constitutional process is a tedious procedure. It should be consciously emphasized that the authors of the constitution are, in the end, the European people. One should thus not shy away from controversial discussions and perhaps also slim majorities in the foreground of one's own disadvantage. This way could even promote the intended, by direct election, politicization of European parliamentarianism.

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FOOTNOTES

1. Federal Constitutional Court, decision of 29 May 1974, E 37, 271.
2. See, among others, the Heidelberg Colloquium of 28 to 30 October 1977 (Basic Rights Protection in Europe, 1977) and the Luxemburg Conference of 2 to 4 June 1977 (Basic Rights in the European Community, 1978).
3. Joint Declaration of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission of the European Communities on Basic Rights, signed in Luxemburg on 5 April 1977, in EUROPA ARCHIV 9/1977, p D234. On this declaration see Hermann Mosler and Rudolf Bernhardt in "Grundrechtsschutz in Europa" [Basic Rights Protection in Europe], p 226; Karl Matthias Meessen (report of 3 June 1977) in "Die Grundrechte in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft" [Basic Rights in the European Community], 1978, p 36.
4. Report of the Commission of the European Communities of 4 February 1976 in BULLETIN DER EUROPÄISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN, Appendix 5/76, p 18.
5. Decision of 16 November 1977 in AMTSBLATT DER EUROPÄISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN (ABJ), C299/26.
6. Negotiations of 12 April 1978 and decision of 13 April 1978 in ABJ, Nr 229, p 174f, 255.
7. European High Court for Human Rights, verdict of 23 June 1976, "Dr. Koenig." Reference in EUROPÄISCHE GRUNDRECHTSZEITSCHRIFT, 1973, p 269.
8. Here see Meessen, JAHRBUCH FÜR INTERNATIONALES RECHT, 17 (1974)283.
9. European High Court, verdict of 17 December 1970, comp. 1970, 1125.
10. European High Court, verdict of 8 April 1976, comp. 1976, 455.
11. General Assembly of the United Nations, Resolution 32/130, 10 December 1977, in UN MONTHLY CHRONICLE, 1/1978, p 127.
12. Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, Declaration of 27 April 1978 in EUROPA ARCHIV, 14/1978, p D423f.
13. Commission (note 4), p 15; European Parliament (note 5).
14. Decision of the Council of 20 September 1976 in EUROPA ARCHIV, 19/1976, p D513.

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15. Report of the Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindeman on the European Union, sent to the Council of Europe on 29 December 1975, in EUROPA ARCHIV, 3/1976, p 055ff.
16. Walter Hallstein, "Die Europäische Gemeinschaft" [The European Community], Duesseldorf/Vienna, second printing, 1974, p 49f.

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DENMARK

PRIME MINISTER DISCUSSES CONCERN OVER WARSAW PACT EXERCISES

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 30 Oct 78 p 6

[Article by correspondent W. A.: "Denmark Concerned About Its Security"]

[Text] Copenhagen, 29 Oct--Denmark observes the military activities of the Warsaw Pact in the Baltic with growing concern. The number and size of exercises has increased substantially in the recent period, Danish Prime Minister Jorgensen told foreign journalists in Copenhagen. He called this development a great problem for the security of the country and thus agreed with his foreign minister, Christophersen, who in a supplementary remark noted that "the Eastern exercises are approaching ever closer to us."

Christophersen commented on the recent decision of President Carter to order the construction of important elements of the so-called neutron bomb. While admitting that Denmark harbored certain reservations, he added that this decision had to be seen--and not in the last resort--against the background of the unceasing rearmament in Eastern Europe. In the opinion of the Danish foreign minister the last word has not been spoken yet in the question of the neutron bomb. He thought that Carter's intention in the first instance, was rather to impose certain obligations on the opposite party in the sphere of disarmament policy. In the Vienna negotiations on force reduction in Europe, too, the interest of Denmark and its partners in the Western defense community was above all in a "new balance" and not in a merely proportional reduction, because the latter would not change the existing imbalance in military strength. In general, it was to be noted that there could be no real detente in Europe "if we are not at the same time in the position adequately to see to our own defense."

Christophersen, who had assumed his office exactly 2 months ago after the liberal Venstre Party led by him had entered into a coalition with Jorgensen's Social-Democrats, expressed himself sceptically about the well-known proposal of President Kekkonen of Finland to declare northern Europe a zone free of nuclear weapons. Without naming the military and strategic advantages accruing from this proposal above all to the Soviet Union, the Danish foreign minister

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said that for his country--as a part of Scandinavia--the important issue was that the "Nordic balance" should be maintained in its present form. The new Swedish foreign minister, Blix, has also pronounced himself in a similar sense in recent days, thus representing a viewpoint which almost ever more resolutely is also shared by Norway.

Denmark, which in contrast to Norway and Sweden is also a member of the European Community, would more than ever like to be seen as a kind of bridge between continental Europe and Scandinavia. According to Christophersen's statement, Copenhagen keeps its Nordic neighbors up to date on developments and discussions inside the EC. He noted that this applies also--and not least--to the present efforts to create a new currency system which Denmark considers indispensable. While for the time being two groupings still oppose one another--one inclined toward a "DM standard" and the other toward a "dollar standard"--Copenhagen was "intent on continuous relationships between the two guiding currencies." Together with most of its EC partners Denmark was of the opinion, he noted, that at the present time the priority issue was to strengthen the American currency.

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DENMARK

COALITION SURVIVES TESTS, READY FOR WAGES BATTLE

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 3 Nov 78 p 12

[Article by Werner Adam: "'Historical Compromise' Starting To Firm Up"]

[Text] In the Far North the Danes are called Scandinavia's Italians. Anyone in the lively city of Copenhagen who makes comparisons with the cool elegance of Stockholm or the rustic, genteel Oslo, can hardly avoid agreeing with such a characterization. The easy inclination toward the good life is felt in many places. The desire to dabble in politics also appears more pronounced in Denmark than anywhere else in northern Europe. Then too, Denmark displays another similarity with Italy: the "historical compromise," in this case an alliance between Social Democrats and Liberals.

Such a coalition has an aura of the sensational, since the two parties found each other here after decades of considering themselves the antipodes of Danish politics. For the first time since the abolition of the absolute monarchy in 1849 they now practice keeping step in some compulsory harmony.

Social Democratic Prime Minister Joergensen explains the term "compulsory" by stating that he had to seek the support of Liberal Venstre in order to find a broader parliamentary base for the government's economy measures which have become indispensable. Alluding to high unemployment and an equally high foreign debt, Venstre boss and new Foreign Minister Christophersen agrees with this justification, adding that no doubt the two parties will stay together until the next elections in February 1981. Of course, neither the Social Democrats nor the Liberals are quite sure. Indeed, they do not question their ability to obtain a sufficient majority in the Folketing, even for unpopular decisions. However, the big unknown factor in this calculation is the position of the trade unions, who feel betrayed by their former co-champion Joergensen.

Holger Jensen, chief economist of the trade union federation LO, warns: If they must find a partner, the Social Democrats should have formed an alliance with the Conservative People's Party. "The Conservatives represent the employers' interests; with them, we know where we stand." He feels that, on the

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other hand, the Venstre Party is not at all liberal but a grouping marked by thoroughly rural characteristics which does not only fight the trade unions but even disputes their right to exist.

Christophersen rejects this reproach. He argues that it is not the masses of employees but only the trade union leaders who harbor a totally unjustified aversion toward his party. To a question as to whether, under these circumstances, the traditional alliance between trade unions and Social Democrats is still guaranteed, LO speaker Jensen replies as follows: "It is true that Anker Joergensen treated our reservations in a reprehensible manner; however, he is a Social Democrat and we, the trade unions, support the Social Democrats."

Even so: The acid test is yet to come for the new coalition. The trade union reluctantly coped with the coalition's first decision, i.e. increasing the value tax in order to curtail the spending sprees of those Danes who live beyond their means. Now the employers will have to pay that much more. Jensen announces that the "tradition" will be continued whereby demands will be made for the following year which would raise the worker's income between 20 and 30 percent. On the other hand, the president of the association of employers, Arne Lund, declared in the presence of LO economists: "It is high time for us to deal offensively with the trade unions and we have decided to demand a 3-percent decrease in wages and a freeze of income during the next 3 years." Jensen finds this plainly absurd and dismisses it with a compassionate smile. Joergensen also concedes that the workers cannot be expected to take a cut in wages. Lund, however, makes the point that Denmark cannot control its unemployment, nor reduce its chronic foreign trade deficit if its belt is not tightened at long last. The government, he continues, must use tax reductions and other "flanking measures" in order to ensure that the real income is not reduced. Nevertheless, drastic economy measures are necessary in order to make domestic industry competitive once again. With a deadly serious face, the LO's chief economist dismisses "flanking measures" with the remark that this is laughable and indicates that he has reason to believe that the coalition is thinking about further tax increases.

The fact that the speakers of the wage-scale negotiating parties jointly placed themselves at the disposal of foreign journalists for questioning allows the supposition that, in spite of everything, they do consider themselves as partners and the contrasting demands are quite debatable. Lund even concedes this in an astonishingly candid manner on the eve of the next wage-scale negotiations by stating that a good deal of "tactics" will be included and play an important role on both sides. Although Jensen does not choose to go this far, he does indeed agree with the employers' president to the effect that the government is now praying every evening "that we may come to terms without its assistance."

Should this not be achieved, the alliance between Social Democrats and Liberals would be subjected to its first serious survival test. But the saying that the stew is much hotter on the stove than on the table also applies to Scandinavia's Italians.

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Meanwhile, the trade unions have learned to get along, more or less, with the "historical compromise."

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FRANCE

COMMENTS ON FRANCOIS-PONCET INSTALLATION

Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 4 Dec 78 pp 34-35

[Article by Claude Jacquemart: "Quai d'Orsay's Man for Europe"]

[Text] The prime qualification for the man to take charge of France's foreign affairs in a period that is taking shape as Europe-centered more than anything else is that he be a dyed-in-the-wool Europeanist. Thursday, at the Quai d'Orsay, Mr Louis de Guiringaud handed over the reins of the Foreign Ministry to Mr Jean Francois-Poncet, who will be 50 years old on 8 December.

Mr Francois-Poncet had just left his post as the Elysee's Secretary-General to Mr Jacques Wahl. Along with Mr Giscard d'Estaing, he will be in Brussels as this week opens, for the European Council meeting.

It is several months now since Mr Francois-Poncet's name was first heard as that of a likely successor to Mr de Guiringaud.

It is several months now since Mr Francois-Poncet's name was first bruited as a likely successor to Mr de Guiringaud. It is possible the latter might have bowed out even sooner had he not, some weeks ago, drawn

Right: Pierre Bernard-Raymond. At the Quai d'Orsay, his special assignment is European matters.



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critical fire for some intemperate remarks about the Lebanese Christians. Even his own majority took him to task over that. By thanking Mr de Guiringaud for his services even a little earlier than planned, the head of state would necessarily have seemed to be bowing to those critics.



Jean Francois-Poncet (top):
Present at the creation
of the European Common
Market.

Mr Jacques Wahl (left),
now Secretary-General at
the Elysee. Last spring
he became deputy Secre-
tary-General, replacing
Mr Yves Cannac, who left
government for the presi-
dency of the Havas Agency.

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Setting up the European Monetary Union, and then the June election of the European Assembly by direct universal suffrage are the first two events the new man at the top at the Quai d'Orsay will be dealing with. On top of that, as of 1 January 1979, the chair of the Council of European Communities rolls around to France again, and it will be the new Foreign Minister who sits in that chair.

Son of the French Ambassador to Germany prior to World War II and again after that war, Mr Francois-Poncet was, from 1956 to 1958, deputy director of staff to Mr Maurice Faure, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and general secretary to the French delegation appointed to negotiate the Common Market and Euratom treaties. He then became Under-Director of European Organizations at the Foreign Ministry.

In 1965, he was on the team put together by Mr Lecanuet to run his campaign for the presidency against General de Gaulle. In 1967 and in 1968 he stood unsuccessfully for Parliament, running on the Democratic Center ticket, then an opposition slate, with the backing of Mr Maurice Faure.

This political activism barred him from high official duties. Separated from government service at his own request in 1971, he became president of the J-J. Carnaud and Forges de Basse-Indre corporation.

Four years later, in December 1975, he left that position at the insistence of Mr Giscard d'Estaing. Starting again as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (with Mr Jean Sauvagnargues), he was next tapped for the Elysee general staff in July 1976, to replace Mr Claude Pierre-Brossolette.

Since that time he has had more than 2 years to familiarize himself with the people and the dossiers, including those on domestic policy.

Mr Francois-Poncet is all for an opening to the left. He made one himself in his home departement of Lot-et-Garonne (one of whose senators is Mr Henri Caillavet, former vice president of the Left Radicals). In 1967, in that departement, he won his first election as General Councilman for the canton of Laplume. Regularly sent back ever since, he was chosen on 22 May of this year as chairman of the General Council of Lot-et-Garonne. He did it with the help of the Left Radical votes who, from the very first ballot, preferred him to the Socialist candidate.

"I could get along just fine with social-democracy," said Francois-Poncet.

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- He took an active part in "Operation Fabre," which last summer
- led Valery Giscard d'Estaing to entrust a study mission to the
- former president of the Left Radicals. And until his move to
- the Quai d'Orsay, the Elysee General Secretary actively encour-
- aged all attempts to breathe life back into the center-left via
- numerous Radical sub-families.

The new Foreign Minister is expected to do considerable reor-
ganizing at the Quai d'Orsay. His European outlook is shared
by both his Secretaries of State, Pierre Bernard-Raymond and
Olivier Stirn, as well as by Foreign Trade Minister Jean-Fran-
cois Deniau.

- The new minister already has one test of strength on his agenda:
- on 15 December the National Assembly opens debate on the expan-
- sion of Europe.

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FRANCE

ROCARD'S 'THREE MISTAKES' COMMENTED UPON

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 2 Dec 78 pp 111-112

[Article by Robert Schneider: "Rocard's Three Mistakes"]

[Text] An isolated Rocard, a Rocard rejected by the right, a Rocard forced into a silence that means allegiance or a confrontation that means suicide. Francois Mitterrand's friends believe that if the "boss" bangs his fist on the table and clearly voices his "Here I am and here I stay!" this will be enough to bring back to its true proportions the Rocard phenomenon, which has been artificially blown up by the press; for it is nothing more than the expression of a reformist current represented by a minority within the Party.

The optimism of the Mitterrand camp can be explained: the first secretary won the first set on 25 and 26 November, in his address to the Socialist Convention in Paris. The victory was predictable: he was fighting on his own home ground. The Convention is like a prism: it distorts the true composition of the Party, for the Mitterrandists are over-generously represented there. And Mitterrand received unexpected assistance from Michel Rocard himself, who in previous weeks had made three mistakes that were handily exploited by Mitterrand.

1) A tactical error: urged on by his followers, Rocard had got off to too rapid and too energetic a start. His personalized, "American-style" campaign, his way of counting more on the media than on the Party, were a source of irritation.

2) A strategic error: by publicizing his intention to send a text in to the Metz Congress, he gave the impression of wanting to attack the first secretary even before knowing whether the latter was ready to negotiate, as had been demanded by Pierre Mauroy. From then on, Rocard was suspected of trying to eat his cake and have it too: the leadership of the Party in the spring of 1979 and the Elysee [=the presidency] in 1981. Many militants

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who favor him as a presidential candidate nevertheless believe that Mitterrand should remain the leader of the Party.

3) A psychological error: Rocard misinterpreted the angry feelings of his friend Mauroy against Mitterrand, believing that he was on the verge of making an alliance with him. Now the Mayor of Lille would impair the unity of the administration only as a last resort. And such leaders as Gilles Martinet, Dominique Taddei, Edgard Pisani, Jean-Pierre Cot and Francoise Gaspard, who are close to Rocard's ideas, let him know that they would not sign a motion with him unless it were also initialed by Mauroy.

Rocard seems to have understood that the best thing for him after that was to behave much more discreetly, and to admit that he was in a delicate position within the Socialist Party.

Has Mitterrand once and for all put his challenger out of the race for the succession? That would be saying too much. An analysis of the opinion polls conducted by Roland Cayrol and Jerome Jaffre shows that Rocard is seen by most Frenchmen (40 percent as opposed to 27 percent) as a better candidate for the presidency than Mitterrand, and this includes the voters on the left. Thus he does not have the "rightist" image that his opponents within the Socialist Party seek to give him.

On the other hand, Mitterrand took two risks at the time of the Convention: that of appearing as the leader of a trend more than as leader of the Party; after sending his picadors into action, he was forced to go into the arena himself; and that of shocking the Socialist electorate--much more moderate than the militants and increasingly distrustful of the Communist Party--by giving a speech that was very much "Pro-Union of the Lefts." To cast Rocard off "as a rightist" and prepare for the possible winning over of CERES [Center for (Socialist) Studies, Research, and Education], the first secretary did not hesitate to make himself the champion of a pure, hard line. "I would not have denied this intervention," was the ironic comment of Jean-Pierre Chevenement. "I only regret that it comes after the March elections." In Mitterrand's mind, it is not a question of simple tactical skill. He really believes that his Party must anchor itself firmly on the left in order to sink its teeth more effectively into the Communist Party and then to force it into making a new agreement. In short, still as always, to reconstruct the union [of the lefts]; but by starting with a new and different relationship of strengths.

At the very moment when discussion of the Socialist project is opening up at the summit, Rocard will not deprive himself of the opportunity to introduce a contrasting image of the Socialist

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Party: that of a party henceforth powerful enough to publicize its own goals without concerning itself about the direction being taken by the Communist Party, without continuing to cling to an economic strategy mapped out in 1971, before the crisis which stopped growth.

Normally, when a test of strength for the leadership of a party begins, the challenger supports a more radical position, which contrasts sharply with the moderation of the incumbent. With Rocard it is just the opposite: the Party does not displease him; the more so since his more "reasonable" style of language seems to be seducing the voters on the left.

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FRANCE

COMMUNIST STUDENT LEADER EXPLAINS REASONS FOR LEAVING PCF

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 4-10 Dec 78 pp 62-63 LD

[Interview with Guy Konopnicki, former PCF member and leader of the Union of Communist Students, by Irene Allier: "It Is Necessary To Do Away with the Idea That Billancourt Is Illiterate"]

[Text] [Question] Some communists are striving from within to reform the PCF while some others, like you, are leaving it. Does your resignation mean that you have lost hope that the party can be reformed?

Guy Konopnicki: One thing is certain--it will be impossible to unfreeze the situation as far as the French Left is concerned unless there is change within the PCF. The fact that I have left it does not mean that I have given up hope of seeing the party change. It means that I have acquired different weapons at a certain moment. In other words, I want to be able to have free scope in my fight. I was tired of having to contend with administrative arguments borrowed from "democratic" centralism which have been used against intellectuals instead of factual arguments. This was my first reason. The second reason was connected with the first--the hardening of the leadership's attitude in recent months accompanied by attempts to win people back--what I call "phoney overtures." An example? The publication of an interesting book critical of the Soviet Union. "The USSR and US," has been allowed but steps have been taken to insure that the discussion on socialism as practiced in the Soviet Union is never connected with either the PCF's history, or prospects for socialism in France or the situation of the international communist movement. As a result, criticisms of the USSR have taken the form of a theoretical discussion--the USSR is far away, the USSR is elsewhere, with its Muzhiks, as it was in 1917 and so forth. It is no longer an active criticism which could have made it possible to think the matter over and insure action by the party at a certain time.

[Question] All this stems from a refusal to discuss the problem of depth.

Konopnicki: This refusal has led the leadership into almost paranoid behavior. I have been struck by the way in which the PCF deliberately exaggerates the extent of the anticommunist campaign. It is true that an anti-communist campaign is being waged but similar campaigns have been waged since

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1920. And the present one is not the most powerful we have known. There was a much more violent one during the presidential campaign. There was a frenzied one during the parliamentary campaign. But in recent months...! True a "PCF on the Wane" operation is in progress but it does not constitute an unusual anticommunist campaign. Someone only has to write a few lines in LE MATIN to make the PCF shout: "Look, there is a plot!" And Marchais immediately makes a statement of extraordinary violence and Andrieu writes an extraordinary editorial. Why? This is exactly a Stalinist kind of behavior. When Stalin decided to liquidate his opponents, he declared that the USSR was a besieged fortress threatened from within and from without. And the trials started. If the PCF is able to show that it is surrounded by adversaries, any dissident will be seen as a traitor, a renegade who kindles the anticommunist campaign.

[Question] Many communists have made a similar analysis without leaving the party.

Konopnicki: Personally I wanted to do two things. First, I wanted to make a gesture of protest against a leadership which has overstepped the mark by lying about socialist countries and the anti-Semitic campaign in the USSR and by refusing to hold an internal discussion. And second, I wanted to give myself some elbow-room in order, among other things, to raise the fundamental problem of internationalism.

[Question] This is not a factor often used by dissidents.

Konopnicki: And yet it is essential. Hitherto all that PCF strategic thought indicated was that the correlation of forces in the world, the conjunction of the three revolutionary currents (the socialist camp, the national liberation movements and the working class in capitalist countries) made peaceful progress toward socialism possible and that the special alliance with the Socialist Party was formed within the framework of this correction of forces. Now what is the situation at present as far as this correlation of forces is concerned? In the socialist camp, the crisis has assumed such proportions that it has occasionally led to war (consider what is taking place between Vietnam and Cambodia and at the Chinese-Soviet border). When you consider the activities of Soviet and Chinese diplomacy it becomes obvious that in the eyes of the Chinese and the Soviets the main enemy is not imperialism. For the Soviets it is China and for the Chinese it is the Soviet Union. Hence the preservation of the status quo in the imperialist camp is consistent with both sides' interests.

[Question] How can the PCF be internationalist on its own if the others fail to keep their promises?

Konopnicki: I observe that a catastrophic situation prevails in the international movement and that the leadership's answer to this is tricolored, French and chauvinist. We are being told: A French kind of socialism will

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be built and everything will be fine. And yet it is well known that the situation prevailing in all the socialist countries affects the situation in France--for instance, Soviet "socialism" does not help to mobilize French workers.

I maintain that, considering all the authority which it enjoys in the International Communist Movement, the PCF could become a new international rallying point for the sound forces of the revolutionary movement and raise the problem of bureaucracy in the USSR for consideration. In short, submit for consideration not only the problem of capitalism but also the problem of socialism.

[Question] Do you believe that rank-and-file militants are awake to this kind of problem?

Koponicki: As a result of my twofold activities as journalist and cultural organizer I have been in contact for many years with workers in enterprises and trade union activists. It is time to put an end, especially in the PCF, to the idea that Billancourt [Paris Working Class Suburb--FBIS] does not understand or that it is illiterate. The only problem is that the PCF frowns on people who disagree with it. This is why we can see thousands of workers and intellectuals trying to express their views through devious speeches acceptable to the party. A Jesuit method, a method used in the corridors of the Vatican, a method generally used in the party.

[Question] A method which makes the possession of keys to help you to decipher what has been written necessary.

Konopnicki: I have acted in this way for several years and I have realized the limitations to speeches of this kind. My resignation means that a more clear-cut break has been effected and it has been a reaction against all this.

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FRANCE

EUROPEAN MONETARY SYSTEM SEEN THREATENED

Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 4 Dec 78 pp 32-33

[Article by Philippe Durupt: "The Monetary Wager"]

[Text] The European monetary system has been at risk ever since its birth. Excessive fluctuation in currencies of the "Nine" seen as prime threat.

Meeting in Brussels on 4 and 5 December, the nine heads of state and government are going to try to reach agreement on the establishment of a European Monetary System (SME). The idea is to make the Community a zone of monetary stability in a world economy that has yet to recover from the trauma of the dollar's fall.

This statement of principle cloaks a whole lot of second thoughts and conflicting interests. Were this not the case, it would be difficult to understand Italy's reluctance and Great Britain's opposition.

The basic idea is to tie the European currencies together by means of more or less fixed systems of parity. A minimum of fluctuation will be allowed. But in relation to what? The technical discussion is extremely complicated: it is also pregnant with consequences.

Ought the Nine, as they did in the snake, set up parities for each currency with margins for fluctuation around a pivotal rate (the parity grid system)? The cost of intervention on the currency markets will rest in that case on the countries with weak currencies. Great Britain and Italy oppose that.

Ought they to set margins for fluctuation on the basis of a basket of currencies? Were they to do that, it would require only a few weak currencies' taking sinking spells for the strong currency to shoot upward and hit the intervention ceiling first.

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Had the machinery really worked over the past few years, Germany would have had to intervene repeatedly to prevent revaluation of the Deutschmark. So Germany is against that idea.

A third system, still more complicated than the earlier two and the child of compromise, has been devised by the Belgians. It retains the parity grid system, but it adds a "divergence index" (currency basket). Whenever one currency strays away from the rest, the Nine will meet and consider measures to be taken by the country with the offending currency. Germany accepts the principle behind this plan, insofar as it retains complete freedom of decision.

The chosen reference money is to be called the "European Currency Unit": it is the product of adding up the member currencies on a proportionate basis, and is worth around 5.65 French francs. The initials of this European accounting currency, ecu, will stir a lot of memories in our national subconscious. ["Ecu" was the old French 5-franc crown piece.]

France has already made two experiments on the monetary union road. On 24 March 1972 and 10 July 1975, Mr Giscard d'Estaing, then finance minister, pegged the franc to the Deutschmark in the currency snake.

Both experiments were failures, and the latest of them -- when the franc dropped out of the snake on 19 March 1976 -- cost the Bank of France 15 billion for its vain attempt to stop it.

Things look more promising today, however. Our currency has returned to greater stability. The modes of intervention contemplated this time afford a little more flexibility. Within 2 years, a sinking fund of 25 billion ecus may be set up.

For the past few weeks, the Bank of France has reportedly been gently letting go of francs by buying up dollars and Deutschmarks on deposit in the nationalized banks. Rumor has it that some \$3 billion has already been affected. The idea is to get franc-Deutschmark parity set at 2.30 francs (instead of at 2.20, which is where the market has it) at the time it goes back into the snake, and thus to snare us an extra margin of around 10 centimes, or 5 percent.

Whatever means may eventually be chosen, the difference between this and past experiments is still one of degree, rather than of kind. The principle of fixed parities itself is still open to question.

Speaking before the European Assembly commission, backers of the Monetary Union have just attacked the flexible exchange rate because "it had not performed the miracles expected of it",

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which included a growth recovery, a drop in unemployment, and a restoration of balances of payments. A charge like that one says a lot about the sort of monetary fetishism that is endemic in political circles.

As Mr Samuel Brittan, a British expert on such matters, explains it, exchange rates are "merely a conveyor belt for inconsistent, unforeseeable, and inflationary monetary policies devised for domestic consumption."

Tinkering with the exchange rate is tantamount to committing the proverbial mistake of the physician who treats symptoms rather than causes.

The Germans will unquestionably make still more concessions on 4 and 5 December. They might, for example, agree to longer repayment terms for countries with weak currencies which became their debtors. The fact is that they see advantages in the proposed system, but those advantages have a price tag on them.

By creating a haven of stability, they would be protecting their markets in Europe (50 percent of their exports) and hedging the Deutschmark from rising too fast against the principal competing currencies, the dollar and the yen.

Not to mention the fact that Mr Schmidt is assured of playing the leading political role within monetary Europe.

The British opposition is equally easy to fathom. A document published in London shows that, if Great Britain were to join the EMS on 1 January 1979, the pound sterling would be overvalued by 23 percent by 1982, the GNP would be down by 9.5 percent, and employment would be up by 2.7 percent.

The French stance is a bit more difficult to grasp. Apparently we are acting more in consonance with political aims, such as a degree of dislike -- albeit latent -- of America, and a fear of anything unforeseen on the part of a country that still bears the brands of tight controls and protectionism.

Speaking to an audience of industry leaders in Brussels on 6 November 1978, Mr Jean Theves, president of the Paris Chamber of Commerce, summed up the two major risks:

Either quasi-permanent speculation against the franc and, consequently, an inevitable (and inglorious) pullout from the EMS; or establishment of a rate of exchange so high as to imperil our competitive stance.

"It is currently fashionable," he added, "to impute to a rising rate of exchange remarkable virtue in the fight against inflation

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and in the effort to restructure the economy. But we must give some thought to the other side of these theoretical advantages: a prolonged business slump, and growing unemployment. And even more, perhaps, to the fact that these remedies are designed for countries where the labor-management consensus and the fabric of industry are both sound and solid."

The inflation rate in France is 10 percent. It will be brought down to 8.5 percent. In Germany it is 3.5 percent, and could rise to 4 or 4.5 percent. The disparity will still be at least 4 percent against us. There is a study which shows that, on the basis of trends over the past 5 years, our economy, in order to keep pace with the deutschmark, would have to cut its inflation rate not just down to the German level, but still further: below 1.5 percent per year, mainly because of differences in the producing and exporting structures between our countries. For example, French exports of semi-finished products are far more sensitive to price variations than are German exports of capital goods. Even given equal price variations, we should be more vulnerable than our partners in the EMS.

We really must not allow ourselves any illusions: our economy cannot possibly break the 8.5-percent barrier without sweeping reforms and without stringent austerity (at least in public spending).

There is every likelihood that the establishment of the system will go through an initial phase of idyllic reconciliation between Helmut Schmidt's Germany and Valery Giscard d'Estaing's France -- a preliminary to the savage attacks that proverbially threaten ill-made matches.

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FRANCE

REASONS FOR CHOICE OF ANTITANK HELICOPTER EXPLAINED

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 2 Dec 78 pp 25-29

[Article by Jean de Galard]

[Text] Within the scope of program authorizations it was planned to provide the Ground Forces Tactical Air Support (ALAT) with 120 Gazelle/HOT anti-tank helicopters, identified as SA-342M built by AEROSPATIALE [National Industrial Aerospace Company].

The French ground forces, it is emphasized by Brig Gen Maurice Cannet, who has commanded the ALAT since June 1977, were the first, and for a long time the only ones, to be provided with anti-tank helicopters. Today, he said, all countries are equipping themselves with this type of aircraft.

The anti-tank helicopters now in existence can be divided into three categories corresponding to three concepts of engagement. In the first are specialized craft with solely anti-tank missions; such is the case with the Hughes 500 Defender, Bolkow 105, Agusta 109, and SA-342M, which range in size from 1.5 to 2.5 tons. In the second are the multipurpose helicopters, which weigh on the order of 4.5 tons and which are suitable on the one hand for missile launching and on the other hand, firing a flat-trajectory weapon and at the same time carrying personnel; the Cobra S and WG13 Lynx belong to this class. The third and last category is that of the complex helicopters, weighing more than 5 tons, and capable of carrying, at the same time, missiles, guns, rockets, and bombs. Belonging to this category are helicopters such as the Soviet Mig 24 and the Hughes AAH, which are veritable "cruisers of the air."

Each army has adopted the concept which corresponds to the mode of engagement it foresees and the experience it possesses. For its part the ALAT has drawn upon its own in putting stress upon the characteristics which to it seem to deserve priority.

It considers that a machine specialized for its principal mission will accomplish it under the best conditions, because construction of the so-called multipurpose machines very often involves compromises in the matter of performance.

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The AEROSPATIALE SA-342M helicopter is the one the ALAT wishes to acquire. We asked Gen Cannet, who is particularly well qualified under the circumstances since he was commanding officer of the ALAT and of an army corps after having been a distinguished Alouette III officer who has flown a total of 4,000 hours in helicopters, to indicate to us in detail the reasons for this choice. They are amply explained in the following article.

Two French Innovations in Use of Helicopters

At the end of the war in Algeria the ground forces had to transform themselves so as to be ready to face a major conflict in Europe where the main threat would consist of armored formations.

Studies and experiments then demonstrated the capability of the helicopter to provide an anti-tank combat system.

Two innovations in the military employment of helicopters were to mark this period: the general use of tactical flight, or flight at greatly varying speeds, close to the ground and between obstacles, and the appearance of a helicopter specialized for destruction of armor.

This new weapons system consisted of three subsidiary components: an over-powered helicopter, artificially stabilized, a long range guided missile, and a gyro-stabilized optical device making it possible to seek out and fire at objectives within the missile's range.

These two innovations, since adopted by all armies, first saw the light of day in France starting in 1962.

The first generation missile-equipped helicopter, the Alouette III/SS11 was installed in the early years of the 1960 decade. It still forms the framework of the ALAT anti-tank units. Its use during exercises organized by the Grandes Unites [corps] however, showed that the anti-tank maneuvers of helicopters resulted in deployment of a relatively complex combat system.

The latter comprises three components: the first, "information," is responsible for locating the enemy and directing the fire facilities; the second, "destruction," consists of the anti-tank missiles; and the third, "maneuvers," allows on the one hand engagement of ground combat units and on the other hand maintenance of a sustained pace by means of air logistics.

The helicopter program of the ground forces corresponded to this concept. In 1966, three helicopter programs were intended to provide the ALAT with a machine for each of these three components: the SA-341 Gazelle for information, the WG-13 Lynx in its ALAT version for anti-tank and fire support missions, and the SA-330 Puma as maneuver helicopters.

In 1969, however, it came to light, on the one hand, that the ground forces would not be able to sustain the financial burden represented by these three

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very similar programs and on the other hand that the WG-13, a multipurpose helicopter of 4.5 tons futed poorly into the maneuvers developed by the anti-tank squadrons. That is why in 1970 the ground forces withdrew from that French-British program, leaving the navy alone on the French side to carry it on.

It was therefore necessary to start a new program, enabling a successor to the Alouette III/SS 11 to be provided.

The renewed questioning in which the ground forces engaged led them to return to the concept of a specialized anti-tank helicopter, responsible for that mission alone, and hence of the smallest possible size.

Study of the Gazelle SA-341 showed that from it could be derived a helicopter corresponding to the tactical requirement and the ground forces general staff decided to favor the SA-342M program.

Characteristics of Anti-tank Helicopters

The SA-342M inherits its geometry and technical specifications from the Gazelle 341 and the composition and characteristics of its subassemblies from the Alouette III/SS 11.

Use of the Alouette III had established a certain number of criteria which had to be met by an anti-tank helicopter:

first of all, it must be greatly over-powered; tactical flight, setting up the launching post between obstacles and in any direction at all with respect to the wind require, under all possible conditions of altitude and temperature, that the pilot is not in danger of reaching the limit of power;

it must be very stable and free from strong vibrations; piloting must not monopolize the crew's attention, particularly when setting up the launching post in the daytime (and further, by night when such launching is possible) and the sighting system must not be disturbed by such vibrations;

it must be discreet; the development of armored units is resulting in their being equipped with an entire panoply of anti-helicopter weapons and the superiority of the helicopter resides in its ability to escape detection;

it must have sufficient autonomy; its mode of engagement is very different from that of support aircraft whose presence at the battlefield is as fleeting as possible;

it must have instrumentation which enables its crew to intervene at the extreme limits of the conditions of visibility permitting the missile to be fired (hence able to hover and return to flight by the instruments) and in part free from difficult navigation and acquisition problems in tactical flight; and

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last, it must be equipped with a long range missile, of high velocity in its trajectory, to minimize the time during which the carrying helicopter is present and not requiring continual training and instruction of the firing operator, which is too expensive to maintain.

If to these characteristics which the new helicopter of the ALAT must satisfy, there is added the simplest possible maintenance and high operational availability rate, it will be appreciated that the new program is not an unambitious one.

Efforts in Five Directions

With the decision made to derive the second generation anti-tank helicopter from the SA-341 following the philosophy which has been so successful for the air force with the family of Mirage aircraft, each derived from its predecessor by successive modifications, efforts were devoted to five areas: motors, equipment, discretion, adaptation to field conditions, and missile launching post.

The Single Turbojet SA-342M

Calculations of weight and minimum essential autonomy, estimated at 2 hours, 30 minutes, resulted in a total take-off weight of 1,900 kilograms. The motor of the SA-341 being inadequate to provide the power margin necessary for such weight, the ground forces had a choice among three motors:

the Astazou III PA (PA = puissance augmentee; increased power) providing about 40 kilowatts more than the Astazou III of the SA-341;

the Arriel, a modular motor of practically the same power but even lower fuel consumption; and

the Astazou XIV, at first glance excessively powerful for the need since it provided 200 kilowatts more than the motor of the SA-341.

The two-motor solution was rejected, the extra cost of a two-motor craft capable of assuring flight with only one motor under highly specialized conditions of tactical flight (altitude-spread diagram) being considered prohibitive.


After flight testing of the three possibilities the choice was the Turbomeca Astazou XIV precisely because of its extra thermal power, analogous with that of the Artouste III which had been considered very valuable in the case of the Alouette III, and because of its high reliability.

However, study of the Astazou III with increased power was not without usefulness. The motors of the SA-341 for observation are in the process of being modified to the PA version so as to permit tactical flights at 1,800 kilograms instead of the former 1,700 kilograms. This modification is being performed at the same time as that which consists of installing an optimized tail rotor on the SA-341.

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The curves below show the margin of thermal power available for tactical flight; at the commencement of a mission, with maximum load, the motor provides a margin of 17 percent of additional power over what is required for hovering without ground effect. That is the power surplus that the ALAT considers necessary for the pilot to have available, at the beginning of the mission, a sufficient margin of safety.

Masse décollable - hors effet sol - du SA-342M à moteur Turbomeca Astazou-XIV, compte tenu de différents niveaux de "marge tactique"



Permissible take-off weight "without ground effect" of the SA-342M with Turbomeca Astazou XIV, allowing for various levels of "tactical margin."

Key:

1. Permissible take-off weight (kilograms) = Masses décollables (kg)
2. Astazou XIV, 426 kilowatts, brake thermal power
3. Margin, 0% [and so forth] = marge
4. Limit [illegible]
5. Limit of pitch = limit de pas

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Unusual Amount of Equipment

The SA-342 is provided with an amount of equipment unusual aboard a helicopter of this size. The "exterior" equipment is conventional; a taxi device to provide camouflage in the field and a sand filter, indispensable in certain theaters of operation.

In contrast, some of the "interior" equipment is completely new; the SA-342M in particular is equipped with three radio communication posts (one VHF-AM, one UHF, and one VHF-FM). This last has two transmitting power levels, which enables it to attain either great range in tactical flight or short range in order to preserve communication discretion. Moreover, this post is equipped with a radio homing device which lets the azimuth of a correspondent station be known.

An IFF permits identification by friendly anti-aircraft forces and improves the weak radar signature, much deserved in combat, but particularly troublesome when reception, upon returning from an operation, is provided by a ground controlled approach.

The helicopter must be able to intervene at the limit of visibility conditions. To that end it must be capable of instrument flying for night movements.

The crew has available autonomous navigation equipment, based upon the Doppler effect for navigation at the front, a radio compass with digital display and automatic to-from sensor for navigation in rear zones, two artificial horizons, and a high precision radio-altimeter.

Last, and above all, stabilization, already excellent with the SA-341, has been further improved with the adoption of an automatic pilot, the fly-through SFIM 85. That equipment was considered necessary to assure fully stabilized flight conditions for launchings at night.

For that purpose the interior and exterior lighting is being studied in order to allow the crew to use goggles with more intense illumination. The ALAT has not yet made its final choice of this type of equipment.

The last new equipment item, the radioactivity detector, is a reminder that the ground forces must remain prepared to face an enemy equipped with nuclear weapons. The layout of the on board panel has been so designed that visibility of the outside, indispensable in tactical flight, remains as satisfactory as on the SA-341.

Great Discretion

The weapons or surveillance systems opposing the helicopter have recourse to varied detection methods: visual, sound, thermal, and electromagnetic.

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In the face of the different detection procedures the first measure is tactical flight so as to try to drown the signal emitted by the helicopter in the "background noise" emitted by the ground. Still, the helicopter's own signal must be sufficiently feeble.

Against visual detection the Gazelle is remarkably effective by virtue of its size and shape. The fact that the SA-341 is practically undetectable to the naked eye, from a background of vegetation at 2,000 meters weighed heavily in the choice of the SA-342M.

As for sound detection, the SA-342M is among the most discreet in the world, thanks to its low level of noise emission in the low frequencies, which are the least attenuated by propagation in the atmosphere.

Against thermal detector the 342M has been equipped with a jet deflector intended to reduce the emission levels in bands I and II, the bands in which the self-guidance units of ground-air missiles now in course of development operate.

It is easy to adapt a jet deflector to a turbine. It is much more difficult to do so in such manner that the equipment does not increase temperatures in front of the turbine and that it is really effective in the face of foreseeable threats. That is why development of such a device takes a long time; the theoretical studies of radiation in the various frequencies of the infrared must be followed by practical tests against a variety of self-guidance units. It was only after study of, and experimentation with several types of jet deflectors that the choice for the SA-342M was made.

Paints with a low level of infrared reflection participate significantly in decreasing the thermal signature. Against electromagnetic detection, the use of rounded shapes and widespread recourse to composite materials give the SA-342 a weaker radar signature than that of similar helicopters of similar size (and consequently, than those of helicopters of greater bulk).

Excellent Reliability in the Field

Experience with the SA-341 was indispensable in development of the SA-342M.

Five hundred ten modifications were studied in the light of experience with the SA-341 and incorporated in the SA-342M. Sometimes they affected only minor details but all resulted in improved conditions for using it and putting it into operation.

The result is manifested by adaptation to conditions in the field which is considered good by the ALAT: no lubrication, visible liquid levels, and quick replacement of assemblies thanks to well adapted tools.

Resistance to impacts has not been proven in a field of battle but tests performed demonstrate what experts call very good "damage tolerance"

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against pointed projectiles and bursts of anti-aircraft charges on the one hand, and tree branches, collision with which in tactical combat flight is difficultly avoidable, on the other hand. In this respect the shrouded tail rotor is one of the better trump cards of the helicopter, permitting landings in contact with bushes which preclude approach of helicopters equipped with conventional opposed rotors.

Four HOT Missiles Rather Than Six

The second generation anti-tank missile, HOT, was designed as a result of experience acquired with the preceding weapons system.

The range of 4,000 meters attained from hovering without modification of the piloting characteristics of the missile at the maximum distance was the main element in its choice.

The results of a duel between anti-tank helicopters and armored formations depend, above any other parameter, upon the mutual acquisition and firing distances. At between 3,500 and 4,000 meters, the distance at which the 342M will try to situate itself, the helicopter is both difficult to detect in tactical flight and outside the range of the direct firing weapons of its enemy.

The ALAT has adopted a system for carrying four missiles. Experience having shown that autonomy in combat is of every importance, it was considered more useful to retain autonomy of 2 hours, 30 minutes which permits, in some situations, two successive interventions with the same fuel load; resupplying missiles at the front is quicker and easier than refilling with fuel, which requires specialized facilities; it is considered that a helicopter can provide more missile launchings per day of combat with four missiles and 2 hours, 30 minutes of autonomy than with six missiles and 2 hours of autonomy.

The development of the launching post with its stabilized optics and automatic remote control took almost 6 years. Even though it is relatively easy to mount missiles on helicopters and launch them under stabilized flight conditions with no wind, good mutual adaptation of the two ensembles, enabling all cases to be covered, demands long and thorough developments.

Launching in a strong wind causes vibrations and a tail wind makes the helicopter less stable. One hundred missiles had to be fired to achieve this adaptation alone of the two ensembles to each other.

At present the missile is only launched by day. Tests are underway to adapt it to firing at night in light provided by illuminating rockets. A patrol of two SA-342M helicopters, guided by ground troops threatened with an armored attack, would then consist of one helicopter firing missile and one "illuminator" helicopter. The arm which supports the missiles, movable in elevation, is compatible with carrying the rocket launcher. It is not now planned to mount upon the SA-342M rocket launchers with types of rockets other than the illuminating rockets.

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There now exist, at the ALAT Applications School at Le Luc, two Dorand DX-147 HOT missile simulators; instruction in launching the missile has already begun. Actual firings are limited to one per student. It can be believed that progress achieved in the area of simulation will even enable instruction to be provided without actual firing.

Utilization of the anti-tank helicopter depends upon very special tactics and training of the SA-342M crews is fundamentally different from that of SA-341 pilots. It is planned to install a television monitoring system aboard some SA-342M helicopters so that the student may later consider the errors he may possibly commit.

Installation of the SA-342M With the Ground Forces

It is planned to install 120 SA-342M helicopters with the ALAT to supplement the 70 Alouette III/SS 11 helicopters in service.

The final developments will take place in 1979. They are mainly related to engagement by night. The Night Experimental Center of the ALAT has determined the interior and exterior lighting modifications allowing piloting by means of intensified illumination with goggles. These modifications remain to be applied; so does continuation of HOT launching tests at night with illumination of objectives by rockets. The problem of marginal complement of lights will be completely solved by the end of next year. In this case the difficulty is more tactical than technical.

The year 1979 will also enable units to be so prepared that the weapons system will be operational when it is delivered. To this end three squadrons equipped with SA-341/HOT are in course of formation. The first, in the month of September 1978, has commenced training the first crews at the Le Luc Applications School of the ALAT. The other two will be placed by units for tactical training. It is the 3E RHC of Etain which will be the first ALAT unit to have the HOT in service.

SA-342M helicopters will be delivered, starting at the end of 1979 and the first units formed in the beginning of 1980.


Only autonomous navigation will be lacking in the earliest helicopters and is to be retrofitted starting in 1981.

Size: Decisive Parameter

The SA-342M built by AEROSPATIALE meets the requirements of the ALAT. The latter considers that size is a decisive parameter for survival of the helicopter on a modern battlefield; the bigger it is, the greater the probability of its being detected and hit. In the specifications for the SA-342M, the studies and work performed by the Studies Bureau of the EMAT [ground forces general staff] (which is to the EMAT what the Equipment Programs Bureau is to the air force general staff) have been of considerable importance. Among the Studies Bureau, the ALAT, and the manufacturer cooperation has been total; from this joint effort there has come an anti-tank helicopter which the ALAT considers very successful.

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An SA-342 equipped with four HOT missiles




The ALAT has evaluated various models of light intensification goggles in order to determine which are best adopted to use upon the helicopter and provide the illumination of the SA-342M corresponding to such use.

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Jet deflector used to eliminate the infrared "signature"



Compatibility with secondary armament: Brandt rocket-launching carrier
(2 x 12 rockets of 68 millimeters)

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FRANCE

USE OF HOT ANTITANK MISSILE ABOARD HELICOPTERS DESCRIBED

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 2 Dec 78 p 32

[Article by Pierre Langereux]

[Text] The Gazelle SA 341F and SA 342M helicopters of the ALAT [Ground Forces Tactical Air Support] are each armed with four HOT anti-tank missiles with range of 4,000 meters, capable of destroying any presently existing tank and even piercing the most sophisticated armor (composite armor) of future combat tanks.

The helicopter, because of its mobility and flexibility of employment which enable it to get past ground obstacles, is an excellent launching platform for exploiting the capabilities of the HOT missile while remaining out of range of enemy defensive facilities. The HOT can be launched from helicopters (Gazelle, BO 105, Dauphin, Lynx, and so forth) and also from armored ground tank destroyers (see AIR & COSMOS, No 740). It is being mass produced for nine countries, among them France and Germany.

The HOT (Haut subsonique Optiquement Teleguide; high subsonic, remotely, optically guided) is a second generation anti-tank missile cooperatively developed by AEROSPATIALE of France and Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm of Germany, with the assistance of the French SAT and German ELTRO firms within the scope of the Euromissile group. It meets the technical specifications of the French and German general staffs and ground forces technical directorates. The latter required a missile with reliability of more than 97 percent, with greater than 90 percent probability of hitting, at distances of from 400 to 4,000 meters, of fixed (2.3 x 2.3 meters) or moving (2.3 x 4.6 meters) NATO targets from a hovering helicopter or one moving laterally at up to 150 kilometers per hour; the firing rate had to enable the helicopter to attack at least three objectives per minute at all distances and to make evasive maneuvers immediately after the missile was launched.

The HOT missile has a military warhead, caliber 136 millimeters, of 6.5 kilograms, of which 3 kilograms are explosive ignited by electrical impulse released by deformation of the nose at impact. The HOT hollow charge pierces

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the NATO target with triple armor (corresponding to 272 millimeters of steel) at up to 65° incident angle and the heavy NATO target for more than 800 millimeters (at 0° incidence). The acceleration propulsor of the HOT brings it to 240 meters per second in 1 second, velocity which is then maintained by the solid fuel cruise motor. The HOT thus travels a distance of 2,000 meters in 9 seconds, 3,000 meters in 13 seconds, and 4,000 meters in 16.3 seconds. With a launch from a helicopter moving laterally at 180 kilometers per hour the range of the HOT can reach 4,400 meters.

The HOT comes as a ready-to-launch weapon, which requires no preparation and no testing before firing and which can be used from -40° to +52°C (NATO standards). The weapon is exactly the same for firing from helicopters or from ground armor. It is 1.3 meters long by 175 millimeters in diameter and weighs 32 kilograms (of which 23.6 kilograms are for the missile itself (1.27 meters long, 165 millimeters in diameter, and overall span of 312 millimeters, wings deployed). The HOT weapon consists of a missile within an expendable tube of resin-fiberglass which serves both as a container for tactical transport and launching ramp. It is delivered in a logistic package and can be stored more than 10 years with no maintenance at all, the missile's power supply being provided by a thermal battery with pyrotechnic excitation which ages extremely slowly.

The HOT firing post for helicopters and ground vehicles is made from a number of standard common parts. The helicopter firing post can be mounted on the craft in 45 minutes by two men. It weighs in toto about 270 kilograms with 128 kilograms for the weapons (four missiles) and 142 kilograms for the launching installations comprising a guidance system with aiming device (73 kilograms) and four manually reloadable launch stands (67 kilograms). The guidance system comprises the electronics boxes for firing and guiding the missiles as well as an APXM-397 SFIM gyrostabilized viewer and localizer device mounted on the roof of the helicopter cabin. This periscopic viewer makes possible observation, detection, acquisition, and identification of the objective (while the helicopter is partially concealed behind a screen) as well as the precise aim at the objective necessary to guide the missile. The HOT is a wire guided missile, with semi-automatic remote infrared control by alignment upon the axes of the optical aim. This guidance system is practically jamproof, except for chance cutting of the remote control wire unreel by the missile in flight.. or shooting down the helicopter.

For launching the HOT missile the helicopter is directed on a bearing toward the objective according to the direction of aim indicated to the pilot by a pointer on the artificial horizon; the launch stands are elevated in accordance with the elevation of the aiming device (from +30° to -20°). The launch operator who is also copilot of the helicopter, has only to keep the reticle of the gyrostabilized viewer upon the objective (precision 0.1 milliradian) and thus press the firing button after having selected one of the four missiles. The missile firing sequence proceeds automatically in 0.55 second; voltage applied from the thermal battery, ignition of the solid fuel gyroscope providing the vertical reference for guidance (the

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missile in autorotation), ignition of the tracers, releasing the missile from its tube, and ignition of the acceleration propulsor. Ignition of the cruise motor and release of the warhead operational safety devices occur automatically during flight.

The missile departs only when the angle of roll is less than 10° and the line of sight makes an angle of less than 3° with the longitudinal axes of the helicopter. When these conditions are met the data is automatically provided to the firing operator (illumination of an indicator light on the sighting reticle). Firing is feasible in all flight configurations of the helicopter, lateral movement or hovering, including especially close to the ground where the helicopter is best protected against enemy weapons. After the missile leaves the helicopter can perform evasive maneuvers (up to 6° per second turning, 45° roll, and 1g lateral load factor) without disturbing the aim of the firing operator since the gyro stabilized viewer makes the sighting axes independent of the helicopter's pitch and yaw.

When it leaves the launch tube (0.6 second of slight) the missile is subject to the optical line of sight by the guidance system. The localizer senses the infrared radiation emitted by the missile's tracers and determines the missile's angular deviation from the line of sight. From these deviations the control computer calculates the remote control signals sent by wire to the missile in order to return it to the line of sight (0.7 second of flight). These signals, decoded by the missile actuate the latter's piloting rudder. One of the original features of the HOT system is that the nozzle of the cruise motor has a single jet-deflecting rudder to direct the missile in both elevation and azimuth, it being stabilized in flight by rotation about its axis of roll; this is accomplished by precise synchronization of jet deviator control and missile rotation. The remote control wire is automatically jettisoned 0.5 second after impact of the missile. A helicopter can thus attack four objectives in less than 2 minutes.

Several hours of flying suffice to instruct a firing operator to manipulate the HOT launching post by means of the DX147 launching simulator of the Giravions Dorand Company.

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FRANCE

AIR FRANCE COMMERCIAL POLICY EXPLAINED

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 2 Dec 78 p 45

[Text] Pierre Sautet, Air France's general agent for France, in a recent speech to the Congress of Travel Agents, meeting in Thailand, laid great stress on the continued advances of the travel. These advances are due to technological progress, to the increased purchasing power of the French, and innovation at the commercial level. To go to the United States from France today takes only one twentieth as much working time as 30 years ago.

Toward Service Adapted to the Price the Customer Pays

"Business" traffic used to represent 80 percent of the activity of the airlines. It now accounts for only half the traffic while family and tourist traffic is tending to become the major part. Such traffic has been developed by establishment of many promotional fares. As the present service provided by air transport is no longer adapted to the new traffic structure it is not sound to provide the same on-board service to customers paying very different fares. The policy toward which the large airlines, and notably Air France, are being directed is to provide service strictly adapted to the price paid by the customer.

The clientele which travels for business reasons needs frequent departures, large reservation facilities, maximum comfort, and complete service so as to arrive at the destination fresh and ready for work. This clientele, which can put a monetary value on time saved, is prepared to pay for the service it needs. The policy of Air France is to meet the needs of this clientele and endeavor to keep it separate.

The clientele which travels for tourism does not have the same needs. It seeks above all to pay as little as possible in order to have a budget as large as possible at its destination. As it cannot put a monetary value on the time saved and as it is paying the cost of such transport out of personal funds it appears prepared to accept simpler service in order to reduce its travel costs. In an aircraft space is valuable and with the conventional service of the regular airlines considerable space is occupied

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by storage of provisions. By reducing those, thereby saving space used for storage, and by slightly reducing the spacing of seats, but redesigning them so as to maintain an acceptable degree of comfort in a reduced space, the number of seats can be increased, the costs can be reduced, allowing fares to be lowered.

Sautet stated that the president [of the company], Pierre Giraudet, will make an important announcement in the course of this month, stating what Air France intends to try an experiment which it hopes to apply generally in 1980.

Development of Charter Flights Will Continue

The equipment of a fleet such as that of Air France cannot be modified over the short term for technical and supply reasons. On the other hand it is the wish of Air France to meet all the needs of the marketplace by adapting its product to its customers. Development of charter flights will continue in 1978; the activity of French charter airlines was greater than in 1977. Such activity will increase further for there is no monopoly, the bulk of the traffic; especially to Spain, being carried by foreign airlines. The very marked decrease in North Atlantic charter flights will continue because of very low fares put into effect by the regular airlines and innovations which they have programmed.

Sautet expressed the hope that the French air transport distribution systems be improved. The entire industry, from carriers to forwarding agents, must exert a constant effort to adapt itself and continually improve its management.

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FRANCE

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF CREIL AFB SECURITY MEASURES

Paris TAM in French 26 Oct 78 p 10

[Article by Guy Richard]

[Text] MSP [Security and Protection Measures]. Air commandos. The photographer had taken his two cases, his Zoom 43-86, and regretted not having the motor. There was going to be some action there. Courage testing course. Crawling, jumping, PM [machine-pistol] firing from the hip. Perhaps some close combat. If we asked politely, they might make us a little demonstration, would they not?

Meeting with Major De Longeaux, chief of security and protection measures at BA [Air Base] 110, at Creil. "MSP military duty is not only crawling." You don't say. "They do not engage in close-combat drill 3 hours a day." Too bad, especially for photographs. Of course, in the MSP there is the protection squadron, consisting of air commando-riflemen. They are the closest to what we were expecting, because they represent the trained combat component strictly speaking. Assigned for protecting the base, their training is earnest, their discipline is rigorous. They are meant to be permanently operational. And in order to respond better to a possible attack attempt or illegal penetration in the base, they sometimes put themselves in the place of their enemies by attacking other air bases. These air bases will, moreover, make it a point of honor to do the same to them some time later.

The conscripts in the protection squadron would like to have more intensive combat training at times, but, according to their officers, they already have a certain degree of effectiveness and utility.

Firefighting Service: Firefighters on the Base but Also on the Outside

"Then, Major, if the commando-riflemen are only one aspect of the MSP, what are the others?" "There are the firefighters in the firefighting service who enjoy an especially important role on the base. They take care of the security of the aircraft runway. They protect the base

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facilities and more especially the nuclear facilities and they participate on behalf of the civilian sector."

In fact, Air Base 110 firefighters lend assistance to the civilians in case of large fires. Although a facilities fire (as happened recently in an HLM [Low-cost Housing Project] or even a forest fire is controlled more rapidly by means of their assistance, their foam projection equipment becomes especially effective in a hydrocarbons fire, like the one that hit a 10,000-square-meter storage facility for oil materials, as short time ago.

For the conscript performing his national service as an MSP firefighter, a direct measurement of the usefulness of his task: the number of lives saved, the value of material preserved.

Radioactivity Measured Every Day

"The nuclear safety specialists must not be forgotten. They too play an important part. Fortunately, they intervene only in a preventive capacity."

For the most part, they have discovered, in the MSP, certain little known aspects of radioactivity: natural radioactivity, for example, that they measure every day. On the one hand, the work of measurement is the preventive aspect of their mission. The work of decontamination likewise, more spectacular: wearing impermeable jumpsuits, headgear, boots, their face disappearing under a breathing mask, they wash, because Mirage aircraft affected (fictitiously!) by radioactive fallout must be washed and then rinsed with abundant water for decontamination.

There is one great objective for the firefighting and nuclear safety services, as well as for the protection squadron: protection of property and persons. Then, if an incident or accident occurs, warning, protection, saving. With a machine pistol, police dogs, a firehose nozzle, wearing dungarees or waterproof clothing or a breathing mask. The uniform or the means matter little. The spirit is the same.

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FRANCE

BRIEFS

POPEREN ON LEFT UNION--Jean Popere, PSF deputy for Rhone Department, suggests in his forthcoming book, "We Are All Outdated" [Nous sommes tous des archaïques], that the socialists try once more, at their April congress, to get the Union on the Left back on track. [Text] [Paris PARIS MATCH 15 Dec 78 p 127]

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ITALY

PCI'S PAJETTA EXPLAINS POLICY ON EEC

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 11-17 Dec 78 p 55 LD

[Undated interview in Rome with PCI Secretariat Member Gian Carlo Pajetta by Macelle Padovani: "Why the PCI Is Not Afraid of Europe"]

[Text] [Question] A section of left in France has reservations about or is even openly hostile to enlarging the European community and strengthening the European parliament's powers. But this is not the case in Italy, where the PCI appears to be the most European of all the parties. Should this be explained by the desire to safeguard your political autonomy, and that of the state you intend to create, in the face of the Soviet Union?

[Answer] I do not understand. We have said that Europe must be capable of cooperating, while preserving its autonomous role and its independence, with both the United States and the Soviet Union. As for the PCI, its autonomy is guaranteed by its policy and by the consensus of millions of Italians. That is all, we need neither the FRG nor Luxembourg to defend it against anyone. To sum up, we want a Europe which is friendly with both superpowers. In other words, capable of cooperating with them.

[Question] Are you not afraid of Europe being dominated by the power of Germany? Despite everything, will you seek a compromise in the European parliament not only with Craxi's and Mitterrand's socialists but also with Schmidt's social democrats?

[Answer] We believe that if Europe is threatened by a power, whoever it may be, it is not by remaining divided that we will best defend it. So, please, let us avoid erecting false barriers which are merely a heritage from another age. But I want to be more precise. If the community has complex tasks to perform, one of them may be to make the Germans understand that they cannot impose their will, that there is no new empire and that these two points favor the interests of the German workers. The great majority of the latter, let us not forget, are represented by the SPD, which you talk of as being Schmidt's but which is no more Schmidt's than Brandt's or anyone else's. We believe that although a joint program is inconceivable, even among communists, agreements can be achieved, even with the social democrats. Anything which may facilitate rebuilding the unity of the workers' movement must be attempted.

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[Question] You face the June European elections with positions which are totally opposed to those of the PCF, which is not only hostile to Portugal, Spain and Greece joining the community and the executive being strengthened but which has embarked on a veritable anti-European crusade. Is this not an election handicap? Will this not complicate your relations with the PCF?

[Answer] We are going to have a meeting with a PCF delegation very soon and we will stress that our mutual autonomy and even our differences over fundamental issues do not stop certain similarities existing; for example, when we together demand a social policy which does not inflict the cost of the economic crisis on the workers and the weakest regions; and when we call for harmonization of community policies with regard to improving working hours, the retirement age and unemployment benefits. The same applies to environment policy, workers' living conditions and the status of immigrants.

These in fact are similarities which we have not only with the PCF but also with other democratic and workers' parties. In short, disagreements exist among us as in other camps--I am thinking of the socialists. It is in our interests not to conceal them, otherwise we would lose all credibility.

[Question] Are you not troubled by the prospect of being in a minority, isolated and perhaps helpless. What do you expect from this Europe.

[Answer] For a long time we were in a minority in our own country's parliament and this neither troubled nor discouraged us, since we are today part of the government majority. One thing we hope to do in the Strasbourg parliament is to insure that Italy itself becomes an active force. And, second, we hope--and this is why we are so in favor of enlarging the community--that Italy will find aid and understanding from countries such as Spain, Greece and Portugal. Even though certain economic similarities place us in competition with these countries, we hope that we will eventually be able to resolve our common problems within the community framework, precisely by asserting this new front of Mediterranean solidarity. But we do not believe in the need for a pitched battle between olive oil and butter or between oranges and milk.

[Question] Could one sum up your policy by saying that you favor a "European compromise?"

[Answer] It is not a question of setting up a state or a government. I spoke of convergences just now and, in view of the fact that no one can consider imposing his will on the others, it is certainly necessary to reach compromises. The word does not shock me at all. And since, at least until the next PCI Congress scheduled for March, it is still permissible to refer to Lenin, I will add that I took this term "compromise" from "the state and revolution"....

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In short, our keenness on Europe is the result of neither a romance nor a passionate affair but rather our observation that there is a battle to be waged and, let us say it, a challenge to be met. But we have confidence in the forces representing Europe's workers. And naturally, above all, we have confidence in ourselves and our policy of unit.

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UNITED KINGDOM

UK OPPOSITION LEADER THATCHER DISCUSSES PAY POLICY

London THE GUARDIAN in English 19 Dec 78 pp 1, 24 LD

[Report by Ian Aitken: "Thatcher's Frosty Olive Branch"]

[Text] Mrs Margaret Thatcher yesterday offered a slightly frostbitten olive branch to the moderates in her own party who are seeking a new approach to pay bargaining and the trade union movement. In a much-debated speech to Paddington Tories, she renounced the concept of a free-for-all on wages, but offered a new slogan of "Freedom Under the Law."

Delivering a keynote speech, which is expected to lay down party policy for the coming election year. Mrs Thatcher refused to give more than a narrow inch or two to her critics. But the concession was sufficient to take the conservative party back to its agreed tramlines on pay policy--the proposals originally contained in its policy document called "The Right Approach to the Economy."

This concession appeared last night to be sufficient to satisfy the moderates in the shadow cabinet who had become alarmed by the apparent lurch towards a "free for all" approach to pay bargaining. They believe that it has retracted the phrases used by Mrs Thatcher at the Conservative Party Conference in October, in which she spoke of "realistic and responsible collective bargaining without government interference."

The change, however, was imperceptible to anyone unrehearsed in the detailed textual issues which have been occupying senior shadow ministers recently. Drafts of Mrs Thatcher's speeches have been circulated over the past few days, and studied with the kind of care normally reserved for newly discovered Egyptian parchments.

To an outside observer, Mrs Thatcher's theme was no less radical and strident than in the past, she revived the issue of the closed shop and the subject of secret ballots in the context of an alleged imbalance between unions and managements as a result of recent labour legislation. She repeated her pledge to deal with these things, although in a somewhat equivocal manner. And she issued a pledge that a future Tory government would neither bash the unions nor bow to them.

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Her keynote phrase was Mr Churchill's slogan for the 1951 general election. "Once more we say 'set the people free' and once more, come the conservative year, we shall do just that," she said.

But the crucial phrase was probably obscure to her audience in Paddington. She said: "Our policy on incomes was set out more than a year ago in our published paper 'The Right Approach to the Economy.' It remains our policy today."

Although she coupled it with familiar pledges about control of the money supply, restraint on government spending and government borrowing, reduced taxation on earnings and new incentives to productivity, the gesture was accepted by those of her shadow cabinet colleagues who feared that the party was becoming identified with the concept of a pay free-for-all.

The concession was wrapped up in a characteristic attack on the labour government's approach to pay policy, the trade unions and industry in general. She argued that the balance of power in normal wage bargaining had been tipped dramatically away from management towards the union as a result of recent government legislation.

She pledged that a future conservative government would look at recent trade union legislation to see what amendments were needed. "For example, we are deeply concerned about some aspects of the closed shop, particularly in cases where it can take a man's job away from him without compensation. We are also considering ways to extend the secret ballot."

But she added that many trade union leaders were daily conducting negotiations with a complete sense of responsibility. "We will consult together in the knowledge that there are prizes to be won, not only by the public but by the unions themselves if sensible reform can be achieved."

She went on: "We shall invite the unions to join with us in building the new and prosperous Britain we all want. We shall not bash the unions. Neither shall we bow to them. In the long run, unions can only prosper when the nation prospers--and vice versa."

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UNITED KINGDOM

UK SHADOW FOREIGN SECRETARY STRESSES EEC TIES

London THE GUARDIAN in English 20 Dec 78 p 24 LD

[Article by Ian Aitken: "Tories Stress Their Commitment to EEC"]

[Text] Mr Francis Pym, Tory spokesman on foreign affairs, yesterday gave the conservative party a new and totally unequivocal commitment to Britain's future role in Europe. His speech, clearly designed to end any residual doubts about the Tory commitment to the Common Market, came just as the argument over Europe seemed to be gaining new strength in the Labour Party.

Mr Pym, addressing journalists in London, poured scorn on the fainthearted attitude of the labour movement towards the EEC and declared firmly that a future conservative government would recognise that Britain's new role must be a European one. He insisted that Europe had not failed Britain but that Britain had failed to make the best of her EEC membership.

A document delivered to labour and trade union readers this week by Mr Denis Healey, the Chancellor, insisted that the promises given to Britain by her partners in Europe before Britain became a member of the EEC had not been fulfilled. It insisted that Britain's net contribution to the EEC's agricultural budget was running at between 600 million pounds sterling and 700 million pounds sterling last year and might well amount to 1,000 million pounds sterling in the current year.

The document, which formed the basis for some heated exchanges between the Prime Minister and left-wing members of Labour's National Executive Committee at a meeting on Monday, conceded that Britain had already become the second largest net contributor to the community budget, even though it is only the seventh in terms of gross national product per head of population. It forecasts that Britain could well become the largest single net contributor by 1980 if corrective action were not taken.

Mr. Callaghan, who was attending a meeting of the liaison committee representing the government, the TUC and the Labour Party, insisted that his government was making real progress in achieving a correction of this trend. But he was challenged by left-wingers to give figures proving that progress was being made. He declined to do so.

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The treasury document, which was circulated by Mr Healey to members of the Liaison Committee, is now expected to be discussed today by the executive committee. It insists that British ministers have sought this year to persuade the community that the severe level of unemployment requires vigorous action in the field of EEC policies.

But Mr Pym took a wholly different approach yesterday. He claimed that the labour government had been at best reluctant and half-hearted, and at worst obstructive and malevolent, in its attitude to the community. He blamed Mr Callaghan for allowing his ministers to go on fighting their old anti-market battles, leaving Britain with no European policy at all.

He declared: "It is high time we lifted our eyes from the ground and looked towards the future. Our new role must be a European one to exercise effective political and economic influence at the European level."

He called for a return to the outward-looking commitment of the last conservative government when it took Britain into Europe. "We seem to have got into the habit of worrying only about ourselves--to be obsessed with our own domestic political battle. It is not a question of suggesting that other people should be put first. In today's world a short-sighted and exclusive concentration on our own problems is the least effective way of finding a solution to them."

Mr Pym was emphatic that withdrawal from Europe was not an option now, and never had been. The arguments for staying in were stronger now even than in 1975. "Only by showing our faith and commitment to the community's purpose can we bank sufficient credit with our friends--credit we can then draw on when special circumstances in Britain have to be considered."

Mr Pym's speech seems certain to delight anti-marketeers in the Labour Party, who believe that Europe has become so unpopular with the electorate that it is an electoral liability to any party which is seen to be wholly committed to Europeanism. But it may also surprise some Tory agnostics in the European debate, who have always believed Mrs Thatcher to be privately unenthusiastic about the community. This view has prevailed among many Tories, even in the face of repeated pledges of Europeanism by Mrs Thatcher.

After Mr Pym's speech, there can no longer be any doubt that the conservative party sees itself officially as the party of Europe once again. He said: "A conservative government will aim to make the best, not the worst, of our membership. We want to show our faith in the community's objectives. A conservative government will work to rebuild our bargaining strength, shamefully run down by Labour Ministers, so as to be able to combine successfully both the protection of particularly British interests and the advance of the community's overall objectives."

He complained that Britain's stock with our European partners now stood at its lowest point ever.

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